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Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District: Graduates, Will We Stand and
Join in Prayer?
The establishment clause of the first amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. .... ,' This pledge of religious freedom strives to isolate
church and state into separate and distinct spheres in order to
protect government from religious influence, as well as to protect
religion from government interference.2 While precedent does not
require complete division between church and state,3 the Supreme
Court of the United States has continually held that a high degree
of separation is necessary when state-sanctioned religious
expression occurs in public school classrooms.4 However, when
religious activity occurs outside the instructional classroom at
1. U.S. CONST. amend .
2. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1984) (O'Connor, I., concurring) (stating that the
purpose of the first amendment religion clauses is to secure religious liberty); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (stating that the goal of the Court is "to prevent as far as possible, the
intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other"). See also Developments in the
Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1606, 1684 (1987) [hereinafter Religion and the
State] (stating that separationism requires that government and religion occupy strictly autonomous
spheres).
3. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) (finding that a
complete wall of separation is impossible); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (recognizing that complete
separation is not possible in an absolute sense).
4. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (striking down a statute requiring a moment of silence
at the beginning of the school day); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (per curiam)
(invalidating a statute which required posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (invalidating a statute that forbade the
teaching of evolution in public schools); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963) (invalidating bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public school classroom);
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (invalidating daily reading of a prayer in public school
classroom imposed by statute); Illinois ex. rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212
(1948) (overturning a "released time" program in which religious teachers provided sectarian
instruction in public schools). See also Religion and the State, supra note 2, at 1659 (noting that the
Supreme Court has found an establishment clause violation in every instance of state-sanctioned
religious expression in public schools).
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school-sanctioned functions, the degree of separation demanded by
the establishment clause becomes less certain.5
While prayer in public primary and secondary schools has been
held to violate the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution,6 the United States Supreme Court has yet to conclude
whether prayer given at a public high school graduation ceremony
is constitutional.7 Lee v. Weisman, currently awaiting decision by
the Supreme Court, challenges invocational prayers at a public
junior high school graduation ceremony.9
The California Supreme Court recently addressed the
constitutionality of invocations and benedictions during public high
school graduation ceremonies in Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District." In a majority opinion, the California Supreme Court
held that prayers presented during public high school graduation
ceremonies violated the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution." However, the Court was unable to reach agreement
regarding the validity of the graduation prayers under the California
Constitution, thereby leaving the California constitutional issues
undecided. 2
5. See Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1408 (6th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that the limitations on school prayer developed for the classroom under the line of cases
beginning with Engle v. Ktale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) had not been extended to include school
functions outside of the instructional period).
6. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (holding that a mandatory moment of silence at the beginning of
the school day for meditation or voluntary prayer violated the establishment clause); Abington, 374
U.S. at 222 (holding that a daily reading of the Bible in class violated the establishment clause);
Engle, 370 U.S. at 436 (holding that a non-denominational daily prayer at the beginning of the school
day violated the establishment clause). See infra notes 73-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
United States Supreme Court's analysis in public school prayer cases).
7. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 899, 809 P.2d 809, 845, 281
Cal. Rptr. 34, 70 (1991) (Panelli, J., dissenting) (stating that the Supreme Court has not decided
whether public high school graduation prayers violate the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution).
8. 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) aff',d. 728 F. Supp. 66 (R.I. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
Lee v. Weisman, 111 U.S. 1305 (1991) (No. 90-1014).
9. Weisman, 908 F.2d at 1091 (considering whether prayers given during a public junior high
school graduation ceremony violated the establishment clause of the United States Constitution).
10. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 864, 809 P.2d 809, 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 35 (1991).
11. Id.
12. IM at 903,809 P.2d at 833,281 Cal. Rptr. at58(1991) (Lucas, CJ., concurring). See infira
notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing the California Constitution).
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This Note examines the approach used by the California
Supreme Court in determining that invocations and benedictions
given during public high school graduation ceremonies violate the
establishment clause of the United States Constitution. Part I
discusses the evolution of the establishment clause, concentrating
on the school prayer and ceremonial prayer cases. 3 Part II
summarizes the facts and procedural history of Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District and reviews the lead, concurring, and
dissenting opinions.14 Part III evaluates the legal implications of
the California Supreme Court's decision in Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District upon future cases brought under both the
United States and California Constitutions, while recognizing the
possible ramifications of the United States Supreme Court's
pending decision in Lee v. Weisman.
1 5
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has developed several
alternative tests in order to analyze the constitutionality of religious
expression under the establishment clause. 6 Lack of coercion,
government neutrality, and accommodation of historically
acceptable practices are factors the Court has addressed continually
in cases which allege establishment clause violations. 17 The test
13. See infra notes 16-100 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 101-191 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 263-270 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the United
States Supreme Court's pending decision in Lee could have upon future cases brought under the
establishment clause of the California Constitution).
16. See infra notes 22-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test and its variations,
the historical significance test of Marsh, and Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis).
17. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 672 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment and dissenting in part) (discussing flexible accommodation of religion); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 789-92 (1983) (discussing the historical significance of ceremonial prayer);
Abington School Dist. V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that a violation of the free
exercise clause is based upon the existence of coercion while the existence of an establishment clause
violation does not depend upon a finding of coercion); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)
(discussing effect of coercion upon the establishment clause); Adam & Gordon, The Doctrine of
Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAuL L. REV. 317, 322-30
(1988) (discussing the historical significance of religious activity and application of the religion
clauses); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "'No
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predominately applied by the United States Supreme Court in
establishment clause cases, and applied by the vast majority of state
and lower federal courts addressing the constitutionality of public
high school graduation prayers is the three prong test announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
18
popularly referred to as the Lemon test. 9  Despite the
overwhelming acceptance of the Lemon test as a framework in
establishment clause analysis, the United States Supreme Court has
been reluctant to formally adopt Lemon as the sole standard by
which to judge all establishment clause cases.2" Therefore, it is
necessary to explore all of the currently available establishment
clause tests before undertaking an analysis of public high school
graduation prayers.2
A. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'2 the United States Supreme Court
combined three previously existing standards into one three part
Endorsement" Test, 86 MicH. L. RnV. 266, 313 (1987) (discussing the importance of government
neutrality and the religion clauses).
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
19. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. School Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1991)
(upholding non-sectarian and non-proselytizing invocations and benedictions written by students and
given at public high school graduation ceremonies under the Lemon test); Jager v. Douglas County
School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 833 (11th Cir. 1989) (invalidating invocation prayers at public school
sponsored football games under the Lemon test); Lundberg v. West Monona Community School Dist.,
731 F. Supp. 331, 345 (W.D. Iowa 1989) (invalidating public high school graduation prayers under
the Lemon test); Graham v. Central Community School Dist, 608 F. Supp. 531, 535 (C.D. Iowa
1985) (invalidating public school graduation prayer after application of the Lemon test); NoWAK &
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1162 n.1 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that the Lemon test has been used
in tie majority of establishment clause cases since the early 1970's); Religion and the State, supra
note 2, at 1676 (stating that the Lemon test has been used since its adoption by the Court in 1971).
See also infra notes 22-57 and accompanying text (discussing application of the three-prong Lemon
test).
20. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 669, 678-79 (1984) (stating the Court's unwillingness
to be confined to any single test). See also Note, Stein v. PlainwelU Community Schools: The
Constitutionality of Prayer in Public High School Commencement Exercises, 22 GA. L. REV. 469,
476 (1988) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has not adopted a test to universally apply
in establishment clause cases).
21. See infra notes 22-72 and accompanying text (discussing the various alternative
establishment clause tests).
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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test,23  stating that: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion. ' ' 24 A violation of any one of these three prongs will
render a statute or government activity unconstitutional under the
establishment clause.25 The Supreme Court originally designed the
tri-parte Lemon test to confront state sponsorship of religious
conduct,26 as well as to prevent financial support and active
government involvement with religion.27 Although these three
factors continue to concern the Supreme Court in establishment
clause cases,28  subsequent Supreme Court case law has
dramatically modified the Lemon test from its original form.29
The first prong of the Lemon test originally required that
legislation or governmental activity have a secular legislative
23. Id at 612. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (establishing the
excessive entanglement prong); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (establishing the
secular purpose and primary effect prongs).
24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
25. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (stating that state action violates the
establishment clause if it fails to satisfy any of the three prongs); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-
41 (1980) (stating that government aid to religion is constitutional only if all three prongs of the
Lemon test are satisfied).
26. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (discussing the Court's concern with government sponsorship
of religious activity).
27. See id. See also Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 (discussing concerns which the establishment
clause seeks to prevent from occurring); Note & Comment, The Establishment Clause in Public
Schools: A Modelfor Future Analysis, 79 GEo. LJ. 121,128 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court's
concerns regarding the establishment clause).
28. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (prohibiting teaching of
evolution since it evidenced state sponsorship and government endorsement of religion); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (finding that mandatory moment of silence in public school was a
state sponsorship of religious activity); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (determining
that the hanging of a creche in county buildings during Christmas was not government sponsorship
of religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (holding that legislative prayer was
not state sponsorship or involvement with religion); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 797-98 (1973) (finding state fimancial aid to non-public schools is a violation of the
establishment clause).
29. See Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Reaine4 Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NoTRE
DAxhm J. L. EmIcs & PUB. POL'Y 513, 515-16 (1990) (stating that the Lemon test has been
materially altered by Supreme Court cases and is barely clinging to the shell of its original state);
Note & Comment, supra note 27, at 128 (stating that recent cases indicate a shift in the Supreme
Court's original articulation of the Lemon test).
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purpose.3" Strict application of the purpose prong led to the
exclusion of all governmental activity that was linked to a religious
purpose, despite the co-existence of a non-religious purpose. 1 The
Supreme Court, however, has moved away from a strict
interpretation of the purpose prong, softening the scrutiny.32 First,
the Supreme Court found it difficult to determine reliably the
subjective motivation behind legislative enactments.33 While some
legislatures had explicitly stated their objectives, many had not.34
Therefore, the Supreme Court was left to determine the possible
motive or purpose behind the legislative enactment.3 5 Finding it
inappropriate for courts to engage in examinations of the inner
workings of legislative bodies, the Supreme Court began altering
the scrutiny required under the purpose prong. 6 Second, the
Supreme Court did not wish to invalidate laws that would have
been acceptable but for an impermissible legislative motive.
37
Invalidating laws based upon an improper purpose was futile since
the law was likely to be re-enacted when cleansed of the improper
30. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
31. See Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 454 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1569 (1989) (upholding employment of church deacon as chaplain of county hospital
involving both a secular and non-secular purpose).
32. See Esbeck, supra note 29, at 515-16 (discussing the shift in the purpose prong analysis).
See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reasons for shifting the purpose
prong analysis).
33. See Esbeck, supra note 29, at 515-16 (stating that the Supreme Court found it difficult to
determine legislative intent).
34. See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (stating that the State Board of Regent's
admitted purpose for requiring a daily prayer in public schools was to promote morality). But see
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,222-23 (1963) (engaging the Court in analysis of
an unstated legislative purpose behind the reading of a daily Bible scripture).
35. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 222-23 (engaging the Court in analysis of an unstated legislative
purpose behind the reading of a daily Bible scripture).
36. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that n
court has no license to psychoanalyze the legislators); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25
(1971) (recognizing the difficulty in analyzing legislative motives). See also Esbeck, supra note 29,
at 515-16 (stating that the Court did not wish to engage in psychoanalyzing legislative bodies).
37. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (discussing the reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to States when a plausible secular purpose could be found on the face of
the statute). See also, Esbeck, supra note 29, at 515-16 (stating that Court did not wish to invalidate
good laws).
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motive.38 Hence, the Supreme Court will currently invalidate
government activity under the purpose prong only if the sole or
preeminent government purpose for the legislative enactment is the
advancement of religion.39
The second prong of the Lemon test initially required that the
primary effect of the contested government activity neither advance
nor inhibit religion.4" In applying the "effect prong," the Court
has continually invalidated laws found to create direct material
benefits to religion, as well as some laws which have been found
to create mere incidental benefits.4 The Supreme Court has
further acknowledged the effect prong's preemptive strike
capability which allows courts to invalidate laws which might
promote religion in the future.42 Using the preemptive strike
38. See Esbeck, supra note 29, at 516 (recognizing that laws invalidated for an
unconstitutional purpose were likely to be redrafted and then re-enacted with a stated proper purpose).
39. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,590 (1987) (discussing the preeminent religious
purpose of teaching religious theory of evolution in public schools); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668,680 (1984) (stating that the government action was motivated solely by religious considerations);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam) (stating that the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms was motivated preeminently by religious purpose which
could not be ignored). A statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose, and in part by a
secular purpose, will not necessarily violate the first prong of Lemon. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41
(stating that a law will be invalidated only when its preeminent feature is the promotion of religion).
The Court has stated that requiring a law's purpose to be unrelated to religion would require
government to "'show a callous indifference to religious groups." Corporation of Presiding Bishop
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
41. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,385,387 (1985) (invalidating release
time from school classroom for religious instruction under the primary purpose and primary effect
prongs of Lemon due to finding a direct benefit to religion). See also Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (invalidating state aid to non-public schools for the expense of
grading test results as an impermissible indirect aid to religion). But see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 622 (1988) (upholding federal law funding anti-abortion counselors, despite an indirect benefit
to religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (upholding municipal Christmas display despite indirect benefit
to religion); WaLz, 397 U.S. at 680 (upholding property tax exemptions for churches and other
religious organizations as an indirect benefit to religion). See generally Esbeck, supra note 29, at 515-
17 (discussing Court's differing applications involving direct and indirect effects upon religion).
42. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385, 387 (applying the preemptive strike capability of the
effect prong to invalidate state financial aid to non-public schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
254 (1977) (invalidating state financial aid to non-public schools through use of the preemptive strike
capability of the effect prong); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370, 372 (1975) (invalidating state
loan to private school since there was a future risk of advancing religion). The preemptive strike
capability has been limited to cases involving pervasively sectarian institutions. See Roemer v.
Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760-61 (1976) (plurality opinion) (limiting the
1455
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capability, courts are able to invalidate government enactments
before any benefit to religious activity actually occurs.43
A further reformulation of Lemon's first and second factors was
introduced by Justice O'Connor in two separate concurring
opinions. First, in Lynch v. Donnelly," Justice O'Connor
suggested that the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test be
addressed under one analysis since the two prongs were closely
directed toward the common goal of ending government
endorsement of religious activity.45 Justice O'Connor articulated
that the proper inquiry under the purpose and effect prongs should
be whether the government intended to convey a message of state
endorsement or disapproval of religion.46 By focusing upon
government endorsement or disapproval of religion, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon
would permit some government-sponsored religious activity despite
an indirect effect, advancement, or inhibition of religion, since not
all religious activity would convey a message of state endorsement
or disapproval. 47  Justice O'Connor, in Wallace v. Jaffree,
48
submitted a further refinement of the Lemon test to the Court by
considering whether an objective observer would think that the
government was endorsing religion through the conduct in iSSUe.49
By focusing upon the message that the particular activity actually
conveyed to an objective observer, Justice O'Connor submitted that
the Court would be able to determine the effect of the legislation
preemptive strike capability of the effect prong to non-public school aid cases).
43. See Esbeck, supra note 29, at 522 (discussing the preemptive quality of the primary effect
prong).
44. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
45. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying an endorsement of relgion analysis to both
purpose and effect prongs).
46. Id at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. IM. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that endorsement
be examined by considering the history, language, and administration of a particular statute to
determine whether it operated to endorse religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
49. 1& at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wallace, Justice O'Connor indicated that moment
of silence statutes that were clearly drafted so as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within
a specific period, without endorsing one alternative over the other, would likely pass the endorsement
test. Id
1456
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in issue without invalidating all state enactments which were found
to have some effect upon religion.5" The Supreme Court adopted
Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU.
51
The third prong of the Lemon test originally required that the
act or conduct not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 52 The Supreme Court looked to both administrative
and political entanglements between church and state to find
whether an excessive entanglement existed.53  Administrative
entanglements have been found by the Supreme Court when the
government has entered itself into the position of restricting or
monitoring religious activity.54 Political entanglements have been
found by the Supreme Court when state assistance to a particular
religious activity involved considerable political controversy, which
entangled the church and state in the political forum.55 Finding
that political entanglements tended to infringe upon the speech and
political activity of religionists, the Court restricted application of
the political entanglement prong to parochial school aid cases.56
Therefore, the Supreme Court, in an excessive entanglement
analysis, will look primarily to whether state involvement with
50. 1d. at 68-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[D]espite its initial promise, the Lemon test has
proved problematic ... [therefore] the standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and
refined in order to make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The relevant issue is how the objective observer
perceived the activity. Id at 76 (O'Connor, L, concurring).
51. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Court declined to overrule the Lemon test, instead articulating
a revised version which considered the issue of whether the challenged government action was likely
to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denomination as an endorsement, or by non-adherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. Id at 593-94. County of Allegheny involved
the constitutionality of hanging a creche inside a courthouse, and a menorah outside of a municipal
building, with signs saluting liberty and a Christmas tree alongside the menorah. Id. at 579. The
Allegheny Court found such practices violated the establishment clause under reformulated
endorsement analysis of the Lemon test. It at 601-02.
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
53. Id. at 614.
54. Ict at 620.
55. 11. at 622.
56. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (limiting the political entanglement prong
to state-sponsorship of parochial schools). Political entanglement, often called political divisiveness,
was designed to prevent political polarization along religious lines. Note, Invoking the Presence of
God at Public High School Graduation Ceremonies: Graham v. Central Community School District,
71 IowA L. REv. 1247, 1267 (1986).
1457
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religious activity resulted in administrative monitoring of
religion. 7
B. The Historical Significance Test: Marsh v. Chambers
In Marsh v. Chambers,58 the Nebraska Legislature's long
standing practice of opening legislative sessions with an
invocational prayer was challenged by several legislative
members. 9 The Nebraska Legislature, throughout the state's
history, had opened its sessions with a prayer given by state-paid
Christian chaplains.' The Supreme Court, rather than applying the
Lemon test, looked to the historical significance of the religious
activity to determine whether history mandated finding the
ceremonial legislative prayer constitutional.6
Recognizing that legislative prayer had been acceptable during
the First Congress, the Court determined that ceremonial prayer
was not conduct that the Framers had intended to exclude under the
establishment clause.62 The Mprsh court determined that historical
patterns alone did not justify legislative prayer, but the historical
patterns shed light upon the draftsmen's intent regarding the
establishment clause.63 Therefore, because the drafters of the
Constitution had themselves engaged in legislative prayer, the
Supreme Court held that the Nebraska Legislature's invocation
prayers were constitutional, as an integral part of American culture
and heritage.'
57. See Esbeck, supra note 29, at 528 n.56 (discussing federal precedent and the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test).
58. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
59. Id. at 785.
60. Id. at 787.
61. Id at 791. The Court did not state a justification for departing from the traditional Lemon
test. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the "Court makes no pretense
of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have
traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment Clause." I& (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 788 n.10. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary had considered the
constitutionality of legislative prayers in 1857, and found that no violation of the establishment clause
existed since legislative prayer was not an establishment of religion. I&.
63. led at 790.
64. Id. at 795.
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Although it is not entirely clear whether the Supreme Court will
expand the historical significance analysis developed in Marsh to
public high school graduations, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal,
in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools,6' concluded that the
historical significance test governed the issue of graduation
prayers.' Stein involved graduation exercises at two high schools
near Kalamazoo, Michigan. 7 Invocations had been included
regularly during graduation ceremonies." Reversing the District
Court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned that since both
graduation and legislative prayers served to solemnize the
respective ceremonies, graduation ceremonies were analogous to
the legislative and judicial sessions referred to in Marsh.6 9
Recognizing that graduation ceremonies involved public school
functions, the Stein Court determined that the public nature of the
graduation ceremony, and the presence of parents, minimized the
potential of coercion.70 The Stein Court, therefore, determined that
the concerns of coercion and peer pressure which existed in the
classroom setting did not exist at the graduation ceremony. 7
Despite the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Stein, the majority of federal
and state courts which have considered graduation prayers have not
adopted the Marsh historical significance test, and have continued
to apply the Lemon factors.72
65. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 1409-10. Cf Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause
Analysis: Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 395, 425 (1989) (stating that Marsh is so
fact specific that it is unclear to what set of facts the holding may apply).
67. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407.
68. 14.
69. d. at 1410.
70. Id
71. Rd.
72. See, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. School Dist, 930 F.2d 416,420,424 (5th Cir. 1991)
(permitting only non-sectarian and non-proselytizing invocations and benedictions written by students
and given at public high school graduation ceremonies after application of the Lemon test); Jager v.
Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 833 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (invalidating invocation prayers
at public school sponsored football games under Lemon test); Lundberg v. West Monona Community
School Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 345 (W.D. Iowa 1989) (invalidating public high school graduation
prayers under the Lemon test); Graham v. Central Community School Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531, 535
(C.D. Iowa 1985) (invalidating public high school graduation ceremony prayers under the Lemon
test). Federal and state court judges, as well as legal scholars criticizing the Stein decision, have
suggested that the Court in Stein erred by failing to continue strict separation between church and
1459
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C. Public Schools: Strict Separation Between Church and State
The United States Supreme Court has consistently found
government involvement with religious activity to violate the
establishment clause in the primary and secondary public school
settings." In the overwhelming majority of public school cases
where establishment clause challenges have been asserted toward
religious conduct in the classroom, the Court has struck down the
challenged activity.74 The Supreme Court has maintained this
strict standard for public schools based on several factors.7 These
factors are best illustrated in three Supreme Court Cases.
In the case of Engle v. Vitale, 6 the New York State Board of
Regents composed a prayer which was to be recited at the start of
the school day, as part of an effort to teach morality to public
state, under the Lemon test, in the public school system. See Note, supra note 20, at 492 (criticizing
the application of Marsh to graduation prayer).
73. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's consistent
separation of church and state in the public school system).
74. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (striking down a statute requiring a
moment of silence at the beginning ofthe school day); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,43 (1980) (per
curiam) (invalidating a statute which required posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (invalidating a statute that forbade the
teaching of evolution); Abington School DisL v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (invalidating
Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962)
(invalidating daily reading ofa prayer imposed by statute); Illinois ex. reL McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (overturning a released time program in which religious teachers provided
sectarian instruction in public schools). But see Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (upholding right of students to form a Christian club that would
abide by the same terms and conditions as other extra-curricular school organizations); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding a New York statute allowing students to be released
from public schools to attend religious services or classes). See Religion and the State, supra note
2, at 1659 (stating that the Supreme Court has found a violation of the establishment clause in nearly
every instance of state-sanctioned religious expression in public schools).
75. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (recognizing that compulsory
education laws make attendance at public school involuntary up to a certain age); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 314 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that a common
American history can not be taught in public schools if religious differences between children are
emphasized in the school setting). See Marshall, "We Know lt When We See It, " The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 541 (1986) (discussing the Supreme Court's justification
for strictly separating religion from the public primary and secondary schools); Note & Comment,
supra note 27, at 133 (discussing the Supreme Court's various justifications for separating church
and state in the public school classroom).
76. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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primary and secondary school students." The prayer was brief,
non-denominational, - and participation was voluntary.7" Shortly
after the practice of reciting the prayer was adopted by the school
district, disgruntled parents filed an action claiming that prayer in
public school was contrary to the beliefs and religions of the
petitioners' families.79
The United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Regent's prayer under the establishment
clause."0 The Court sought to determine the result which the
prayer was designed to promote.81 Due to the religious
significance of reciting a daily prayer, the Court found that the
purpose of the prayer was to promote religion.82 Further, although
participation was voluntary, the Engle Court found the school
environment particularly coercive, due to the vulnerability of
primary and secondary school students under the guidance of their
teachers and the influence of their peers. 3 Therefore, coupling
the coercive environment with the prayer's religious purpose, the
Engle Court held that mandatory daily prayers in public school
classrooms violated the establishment clause.
8 4
The United States Supreme Court was again faced with
legislative enactments requiring public school prayer in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp" School attendance
77. Id. at 423. The students were to recite the following prayer
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.
Id.
78. Id. at 438,441. The prayer in Engle was deemed voluntary because children could refuse
to recite the prayer. Id. at 430. See generally Sutherland, Establishment According to Engle, 76
HARv. L. REv. 25 (1962) (discussing the Engle Court's analysis of school prayer under the
establishment clause).
79. Engle, 370 U.S. at 423.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 424-25. The Lemon test was not adopted until after consideration of Engle. See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). However, the Court's focus in Engle could be analogized
to the purpose prong of the Lemon test because the goal of both was to determine the purpose of the
religious activity. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing the primary purpose
prong of the Lemon test).
82. Engle, 370 U.S. at 424-25.
83. ld at 430.
84. 14 at 436.
85. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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was mandatory in the Abington school district, but students could
be excused from the classroom during the daily Bible reading and
prayer session at the request of a parent.86 The Abington Court
established a new standard to evaluate school prayer under the
establishment clause, which looked to the primary purpose and
effect of the legislative enactments.8 7 This test eventually became
the first and second prongs of the three-part Lemon test. 8
Applying the purpose and effect test, the Abington Court, based
on the State's own concession during trial, found that the prayers
had religious and moral implications. 9 Further, the Court found
that the daily recitation of prayers and Bible readings was designed
to promote religious ideals.' Therefore, the purpose and effect
test had been violated by the daily recitation of religious
prayers.91
In Wallace v. Jaffree,' the most recent United States Supreme
Court case dealing with school prayer, the Court was faced with
determining the constitutionality of a mandatory moment of
silence.93 The period of silence, according to the Alabama statute,
was to be used for a voluntary prayer or for meditation. 9'
Applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court determined that the
legislative purpose was to advance religious activity by forcing
prayer upon students in a coercive environment.95 The Wallace
Court further determined that the state was endorsing prayer by
enacting a mandatory moment of silence, and that therefore, the
activity conflicted with the course of neutrality between church and
86. Id. at 205.
87. Id See supra notes 22-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test).
88. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and effect prongs
of the Lemon test).
89. Abington, 374 U.S. at 224 (maintaining that the state had conceded during trial that the
prayers were religious in nature and character).
90. Id
91. Id at 223.
92. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
93. Id at 40. See generally, Smith, Now is the Timefor Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and its
Legislative Aftermath, 37 ALA. L Rgv. 345 (1986) (discussing the Wallace Court's establishment
clause analysis).
94. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
95. Id at 61.
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state laid out by establishment clause precedent.96 Accordingly,
the Wallace Court held that the mandatory moment of silence was
unconstitutional under the establishment clause since it violated the
primary purpose prong of the Lemon test.97
D. The Establishment Clause of the California Constitution
California courts have traditionally been free to interpret the
California Constitution independently from the United States
Constitution.98 Distinguished from the federal constitution, the
California Constitution contains three articles discussing state and
church relations, providing far more detailed and comprehensive
language than the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution." In several cases in which the California Supreme
Court has considered the establishment clause of article I, section
4, the Court has continually applied the three prong Lemon test,
96. Id
97. Id The Wallace Court stated that the moment of silence might have been upheld had the
legislature's purpose not been to restore a form of daily prayer to the public school system. Id at 59.
98. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (stating that state court
constitutional decisions are shielded from federal review only if the judgment clearly relies upon
independent state constitutional grounds); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487,491-
92 (1965) (stating that the Supreme Court has long recognized the right of the states to interpret
textually similar passages of state constitutions in a broader manner than parallel federal guarantees);
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (stating "[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependant on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution").
99. Article I, section 4 of the California Constitution states:
Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution states:
No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or
denominational school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the
public schools; nor shall any sectarian or denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction
thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State.
CAL CoNST. art. IX. § 8 states. Article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution states:
Neither the Legislature, nor any ... school district ... shall ever make an appropriation,
or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect,
church, creed, or sectarian denomination whatever ....
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. This Note primarily focuses upon the establishment clause of the
California Constitution. The free exercise and "no preference" clauses of article I, section 4 as well
as article XVI, section 5 and article IX, section 8 are beyond the scope of this Note.
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declining to extend the California establishment clause beyond
federal precedent."
I. THE CASE
A. The Factual and Procedural History
Respondent Morongo Unified School District (District) consists
of two public high schools and two alternative/continuation high
schools situated in San Bernardino County, California.'' Over
the course of several years, graduation ceremonies at the schools
had included opening invocations and closing benedictions. 12
100. See, e.g., Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663,150 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1978) (holding that under the Lemon test, the city of Los Angeles could not display an illuminated
crucifix on city hall to honor Christmas or Easter holidays under article I, section 4); California
Educational Facility Authority v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr 361 (1974)
(holding that state funding of an institution of higher learning, which is affiliated with or governed
by a religious organization, does not violate of article I, section 4 under the Lemon test). The only
case to expand the scope of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution beyond the Lemon test
is the California Court of Appeal's decision in Feminist Women's Health Center v. Philibosian, 157
Cal. App. 3d 1076, 302 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984) reh' denied, cert. denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). In
Philibosian, the Second District Court of Appeal was faced with determining whether the District
Attorney could allow the internment of 16,500 aborted fetuses in a local cemetery which had
contracted with a Catholic organization to hold memorial services at the burial site. li After finding
that the District Attorney's actions violated the Lemon test, the California Court of Appeal expanded
article 1, section 4 beyond the federal establishment clause in three ways. ld. at 1089,302 Cal. Rptr.
at 927. First, the California Court of Appeal stated that California must avoid any and all appearance
of religious partiality, ignoring any official accommodation of religion, while the federal constitution
has allowed some accommodation. lI. at 1090,302 Cal. Rptr. at 928. Second, political entanglement,
a factor deemed inconsequential by federal precedent, was important to the California Court of
Appeal. Id at 1091, 302 Cal. Rptr. at 929. Third, the California Court of Appeal required a
compelling state interest to justify any government activity that preferred one religion over another,
where the federal courts had held such strict scrutiny limited to religious discrimination cases. Id at
1092, 302 Cal. Rptr. at 930. Despite the broad interpretation of article 1, section 4 by the appellate
court in Philibosian, other California courts have been reluctant to expand article I, section 4 in the
same manner even though the California Supreme Court, by refusing to grant a rehearing in
Philibosian, refused to restrict the appellate court's approach. Id. at 1093, 302 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
101. Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 868, 809 P.2d 809, 810, 281
Cal. Rptr. 34, 35 (1991). The four schools are Yucca Valley High School, Twenty-Nine Palms High
School, Sky High School, and Monument High School. Id.
102. Id. Prayers have occurred at Yucca Valley High School since 1968, Twenty-Nine Palms
High School since 1937, Sky High School since 1977, and Monument High School since 1978. I.
The 1986 Yucca Valley High School invocation, which the California Supreme Court listed as an
example of the prayers from all four schools, was as follows:
Will the audience please stand and join us in prayer.
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The prayers were brief, and the District asserted that an effort was
made to maintain non-denominational tones throughout both the
invocation and benediction." 3  Although the speakers were
primarily clergymen, non-clergy faculty members were also asked
Dear Father, we thank You for these graduates who have meant to much to us. We
thank You for their energy, their enthusiasm, their sense of humor and their sense for life.
May the years never diminish these traits.
We ask Your guidance as these graduates try to meet the many challenges of their
future years. Grant them the strength to meet these challenges with courage, confidence
and faith.
We ask Your blessings so that their lives will brim with happiness and good health.
And that each one experiences a life rich in friendship and rich in love.
Finally, we ask these young men and women, mature in years, may they forever
remain young at heart and free in spirit. We ask this in Your name, amen.
keL at 948, 809 P.2d at 864-65, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90 (Baxter, J., dissenting). The invocation given
in 1986 at Yucca Valley High School stated:
Graduates, faculty, friends, family. I consider it a privilege to be here this evening
to do the Invocation, particularly as I look back to 20 years ago today that I graduated
from high school.
Its a real blessing to speak to you and encourage you to be confident in looking
forward to the years ahead. That hope, that confidence, that indeed there are certain to be
changes to come, will come. Yet each point of change is an opportunity for growth. And
I want to encourage you to have confidence looking forward to that.
And so it is that I was to even extend that in a Prayer. That as you have the
opportunity to grow and change, and to face things, and sometimes those things will cause
you to be apprehensive, cause you to begin to doubt, I have found that for myself its good
to have something, someone to trust in that is greater than yourself.
So if you would like to you can bow your head, if not, feel free not to, that's what
freedom is all about.
Heavenly father, I thank you for the privilege it is to see these graduates going forth
receiving their diplomas this evening. To celebrate this time, I pray that you would give
them that blessing, that confidence, courage, vision, hope, peace and gladness, and looking
forward to the days to come, the years to come being confident of what they have already
been able to do in receiving this diploma.
Now I pray your blessing upon them, in the name of our Lord, amen.
Ia (Baxter, J., dissenting).
103. Id at 875, 809 P.2d at 815-16, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41. In his concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Lucas stated that the prayers occupied one minute or less in a forty-five to ninety minute
program. Id at 893, 809 P.2d at 827, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
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to perform the prayers on at least one occasion.' 4 Further,
attendance by the graduating students was purely voluntary' w5
Petitioners Jim Sands and Jean Bertolette, local taxpayers who
resided within the District, objected to the use of religious prayers
at the public school graduations." 6 After unsuccessful attempts
to persuade the District to discontinue the inclusion of prayers at
the graduation ceremonies, the petitioners filed suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the practice.' 7 While
the petitioners' action was pending in the trial court, California's
First District Court of Appeal, applying the Lemon test, held in
Bennett v. Livermore Unified School District,"'8 that prayer at
public high school graduation ceremonies violated the
establishment clause of both federal and state constitutions.10 9
After the Bennett decision, the Sands petitioners and the District
104. Id, at 868, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35. At Yucca Valley High, Protestant
ministers and faculty members gave the benediction in 1985 and in 1986. Id At Twenty-Nine Palms
High, a Presbyterian minister delivered the invocation and a Catholic priest gave the benediction. Id
At Monument High, a Protestant minister delivered both the opening and closing prayers. Id At Sky
High, the same Methodist pastor had given the invocation and benediction every year since 1977. Id.
105. Id at 893, 809 P.2d at 827, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Lucas noted that admission tickets were given only to graduating students and their families, and that
diplomas were not contingent on attendance at the graduation ceremony. Id
106. Id, at 869, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
107. Id at 869-70, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The petitioners' filed suit under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 525(a), which authorizes taxpayers' actions against local
public entities to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of public funds. Id at 869, 809 P.2d at 811, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 36.
108. 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987).
109. Id Prior to the California Supreme Court's consideration of Sands v. Morongo Unified
School Dist, two California Courts of Appeal disagreed as to whether graduation prayers violated
the California Constitution. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 867, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36. While
the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Sands found that graduation prayers did not violate the
California Constitution, the First District Court of Appeal in Bennett v. Livermore Unified School
District reached a contrary conclusion. Bennett, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 1020,238 Cal. Rptr. at 824. In
Bennett, a high school senior filed an action against the District challenging the practice of including
an invocation in graduation ceremonies. Id. at 1014,262 Cal. Rptr. at 820. The Bennett court applied
the Lemon test, stating that the federal establishment clause standards were useful in determining the
constitutionality of graduation prayers since this was a case of first impression in California. Id. at
1017,262 Cal. Rptr. at 821. The Court of Appeal found that the graduation prayers violated all three
prongs of the Lemon test. Id at 1020, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 824. Further, the Court of Appeal stated that
California constitutional provisions were to be interpreted as granting broader protection against
religious interference than those of the federal constitution. 14 at 1020, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals in Bennett held that both the federal and California Constitutions
were violated by the graduation prayers. Id at 1024, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
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each filed motions for summary judgment.11° The trial court
granted the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and denied
the District's similar motion, after which the District appealed.'11
The Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal, applying the
Lemon test, reversed the trial court's granting of petitioners' motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the prayer in issue did not
violate the establishment clause of the United States Constitution
or the California Constitution.112 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of California granted review in Sands to resolve the
constitutional questions that existed between the two California
Courts of Appeal decisions in Bennett and Sands."3
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennard, writing the lead opinion for the majority of the
California Supreme Court," 4 reversed the Fourth District Court
of Appeal and held that religious invocations and benedictions at
public high school graduation ceremonies were an unconstitutional
violation of the establishment clause under the Lemon test."5
Despite recognizing the existence of alternative tests, Justice
Kennard stated that federal constitutional cases such as Sands were
to be determined by federal precedent as it presently existed."
6
Therefore, since the Lemon test was the test predominantly used by
the United States Supreme Court in establishment clause cases, the
majority held that the three-prong analysis was the correct test."7
110. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 870, 809 P.2d 809, 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 36.
111. 1d The District appealed to challenge the trial court's granting of the petitioner's motion
for summary judgment. kd
112. I
113. Id.
114. The Sands decision produced a lead opinion by Justice Kennard, three concurring opinions
by Chief Justice Lucas, Justice Mosk, and Justice Arabian, respectively, and two dissenting opinions
by Justice Panelli and Justice Baxter, respectively. Id at 863, 809 P.2d at 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
Justice Broussard and Justice Mosk concurred and signed onto Justice Kennard's opinion. Id Chief
Justice Arabian concurred only in the judgment of Justice Kennard's opinion, and Justice Arabian
concurred in the holding by Justice Kennard's opinion. Id
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Applying the three prongs of the Lemon test, Justice Kennard
determined that the effect and excessive entanglement prongs had
been violated,"' but declined to apply the primary purpose
prong. 119
Applying the primary effect prong of the Lemon test, Justice
Kennard determined that the appropriate analysis under the effect
prong was Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis.12 0 The Court
in Sands found that prayer is, by nature and content, a fundamental
religious practice for many religious denominations.1 ' Therefore,
the Court held that by allowing the religiously recognized practice
of prayer to take place at a school-sanctioned celebration, the
District was sending a strong message of government endorsement
of religious conduct. Accordingly, the majority concluded that,
irrespective of the District's actual objective of solemnizing the
ceremony, the effect of the practice was to convey a message of
religious endorsement, thereby violating the primary effect prong
of Lemon."
Addressing the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test,
Justice Kennard determined that supervision of religious practices
at a school function was in direct conflict with the establishment
clause goal of separating church and state. 124 The Court
concluded that due to the participation of school officials in the
118. Id
119. Id Justice Kennard stated that the primary purpose of allowing the prayers did not need
to be addressed since the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs had been violated. Id
120. Id at 867, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
121. Id Justice Kennard relied upon the United States Supreme Court's statement in Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962), which concluded that prayers were religious in nature. Id
122. Id at 876, 809 P.2d at 815, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39. Justice Kennard stated that the
establishment clause prohibits governments from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief. Id Further, the Justice Kennard concluded that the state, through the practice of
allowing prayer, appeared to favor religion over non-religion by recognizing a religion which
addresses a single deity over all other religions or non-believers. Id The majority opinion stated that
the short, limited nature of the encroachment did not make the prayer constitutional since the focus
of concern was upon the religious character, not the duration. Id at 877, 809 P.2d at 815, 281 Cal.
Rptr. at 40.
123. Id at 879, 809 P.2d at 817, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
124. Id The majority relied upon United States Supreme Court's statements in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,620 (1971), which indicated that state inspection and evaluation of religious
content was unconstitutional. Id
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selection of the invocation speakers and in the monitoring of prayer
content, excessive administrative entanglement existed. " In
addition, the Sands Court reasoned that the school officials would
be prone to choosing speakers who supported a creed or religion
with which the school official was familiar, creating entanglements
between church and state.126 Therefore, the majority in Sands
held that the invocation prayers were a violation of the third prong
of the Lemon test.127
Justice Kennard next addressed the application of the historical
and cultural significance test developed in Marsh v. Chambers.
1 28
The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU 29 had stated that Marsh should not be
misinterpreted to suggest that all 200 year old practices be deemed
constitutional based on the existence of that practice during the
time the Framers were in office.13 Further, the majority asserted
that the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard1
31
had stated that the Marsh historical significance test was not useful
in public school cases since the free public education system did
not exist during the time of the Framers.132 The fact that
ceremonial invocations had been allowed in Nebraska's legislative
sessions, therefore, did not persuade the California Supreme Court
to extend the Marsh rule to ceremonial prayers at public high
school graduations.
133
125. 1l at 880, 809 P.2d at 818, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
126. Id. Justice Kennard determined that school officials would have no basis upon which to
select speakers, other than to rely upon personal religious preferences. Id. Justice Kennard apparently
did not rely upon any direct proof or evidence of such a conclusion. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 881, 809 P.2d at 819,281 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Marsh v. Chambers).
129. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
130. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 881, 809 P.2d 809, 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 44 (1991) (citing
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). Further, the Court stated that the application
of Marsh by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d
1406 (1987), was error since the Lemon test had been the predominate test in school prayer cases.
Sands, 53 Cal. 3d. at 882, 809 P.2d at 820, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
131. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
132. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 881, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (citing Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)).
133. Id
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Finally, Justice Kennard sought to hold the graduation prayers
unconstitutional under the establishment clause of the California
Constitution.134 However, this portion of Justice Kennard's
opinion did not gain the support of a majority of the Court.'35
According to Justice Kennard, the establishment clause of the
California Constitution was to be interpreted by the California
Supreme Court independent of federal precedent, despite the fact
that its language is virtually identical to the federal establishment
clause.'3 6  However, Justice Kennard did not provide an
independent analysis of the Sands case under the California
establishment clause. 137
C. Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Lucas
Chief Justice Lucas wrote separately for two reasons: First to
express his discontent with the application of the Lemon test to
graduation prayers in public school, and second, to express his
134. Id. at 882,809 P.2d at 820,281 Cal. Rptr. at 45. Justice Kennard also looked to two other
provisions of the California Constitution which provide additional guarantees that church and state
would remain completely separate. Id at 874, 809 P.2d at 822, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. Justice
Kennard reasoned that the state appeared to take a position on endorsing religion through
government sponsorship of prayer at graduation ceremonies in public schools, which clearly violated
the "no preference" clause of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution. Id Justice Kennard
relied upon the majority's earlier analysis of the graduation prayers under the purpose and effect
prongs of the Lemon test, where the Sands Court had concluded that the prayers in issue were a
symbol of government endorsement Id Government endorsement, according to Justice Kennard, was
clearly an indication of a government preference toward religion. Id Justice Kennard also relied upon
article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution, determining that article XVI, section 5 prohibited
any official involvement by government which directly or indirectly promoted religion. Id
Concluding that graduation prayers promoted religion by endorsing religious conduct at a school
sanctioned event, Justice Kennard held that the conduct in issue had clearly violated article I, section
4 and article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution. Id See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4; CAL.
CoNsT. art. XVI, § 5.
135. Id. at 887, 809 P.2d at 833, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 58 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Lucas stated that as a result of the various opinions, the Sands decision did not contain a majority
of the Court regarding the California constitutional issues. Id,
136. fid at 874, 809 P.2d at 820, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
137. Id. at 883, 809 P.2d at 820, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 45. Justice Kennard stated that the practice
of government endorsement of graduation prayers violated not only the establishment clause of First
Amendment, but also independently violated the establishment clause of article I, section 4 of the
California Constitution. Id Justice Kennard did not explain this conclusion.
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unwillingness to reach a decision under the California
Constitution.'38 The Chief Justice conceded that the Court was
bound under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution to apply federal precedent, and reluctantly concurred
in the majority's judgment that the effect prong of the Lemon test
had been violated.139
Although conceding that the California Supreme Court was
bound under the Supremacy Clause to apply the Lemon test to the
federal establishment clause issues in Sands, Chief Justice Lucas
expressed his dissatisfaction with application of the three prong test
in the graduation arena. 4 ° Despite finding that the United States
Supreme Court had continually kept school and prayer separated
through application of Lemon, the Chief Justice suggested that the
reasons for keeping prayer out of the classroom were not as evident
in the graduation ceremony context.1 41 Further, Chief Justice
Lucas found that ceremonial prayer had been a traditional part of
American history and culture since the drafting of the
Constitution. 42
In suggesting possible alternatives to the Lemon test, Chief
Justice Lucas considered the application of the historical analysis
138. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 884, 809 P.2d at 821,281 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
Chief Justice Lucas was reluctant to concur for several reasons. Id. (Lucas, CJ., concurring). First,
the Chief Justice preferred to await the United States Supreme Court's pending decision in Lee v.
Weisman, No. 90-1014 (1991), before deciding the Sands decision. Id (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
Second, the Chief Justice recognized that the state of establishment clause law was in a state of flux
since the Lemon test had been criticized by several of the United States Supreme Court Justices. Id
(Lucas, CJ., concurring).
139. Id at 884-85, 809 P.2d at 821,281 Cal. Rptr. at46 (Lucas, CJ., concurring). Chief Justice
Lucas did not formally address the application of the Lemon test, and simply concurred with the
majority's conclusion that the prayers in issue violated the establishment clause under the second
prong of Lemon. kd (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
140. Id at 885, 809 P.2d at 821-22, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47 (Lucas, CJ., concurring). The
Chief Justice recognized that Marsh had allowed ceremonial legislative prayers, and further, that
several Supreme Court Justices had expressed dissatisfaction with the three-prong Lemon test. Id
(Lucas, CJ., concurring). Therefore, if the Supremacy Clause had not bound the Court to apply the
Lemon test, Chief Justice Lucas would have preferred the historical significance test of Marsh. let
(Lucas, CJ., concurring).
141. The Chief Justice found that the vulnerability and impressionability of classroom primary
and secondary students was not as evident at graduation ceremonies. Id. at 889,809 P.2d at 831,281
Cal. Rptr. at 56 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
142. Id. at 890-92, 809 P.2d at 825-27, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 50-52 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
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test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh v.
Chambers.4 ' Examining America's religious heritage, the Chief
Justice compared public school graduation ceremonies to the
Nebraska legislative ceremonies considered in Marsh.' Finding
that the graduation prayers were purely voluntary and that the
references to "God" easily conformed to fit many different
interpretations, the Chief Justice reasoned that the prayers in Sands
were analogous to the legislative prayers in Marsh.'45 Both
prayers, according to the Chief Justice, served a secular function of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future,
and encouraging recognition of what is considered worthy in
society.
146
Chief Justice Lucas determined that when the state engaged in
a religious activity similar to harmless acknowledgments endorsed
by the Framers and supported by use throughout history, the
government activity should be upheld. 47 The Chief Justice stated
that if the Court had not been bound by federal precedent, he
would have upheld the prayers in issue as a mere accommodation
of a historically acceptable practice under the Marsh analysis.
148
Finally, the Chief Justice concluded his opinion by declining to
address whether the graduation prayers violated the California
Constitution until the federal issues had been settled by the United
States Supreme Court. 49
143. Id. at 897, 809 P.2d at 830, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Addressing
Justice Kennard's reliance upon dicta in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,583 n.4 (1987), which
stated that a historical approach is not appropriate to determinations in public schools since public
education did not exist during the time the Constitution was adopted, Chief Justice Lucas asserted
that the Edwards dicta did not necessarily exclude application of Marsh in the public school setting.
kd at 898, 809 P.2d at 831, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (Lucas, CJ,, concurring). Instead, the Chief Justice
suggested that the dicta of Edwards was limited to classroom instruction cases since the Edwards
decision was aimed at prohibiting the teaching of creation science in public school classrooms, not
at activities outside the instructional environment. Id. (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
144. Id. (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
145. Id. at 895, 809 P.2d at 829, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
146. 1, (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Legislative prayers and graduation prayers both indicate an
acknowledgment of religious beliefs widely held in this country. Id
147. AL at 901, 809 P.2d at 833, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 58 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
148. AL (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
149. AL at 905, 809 P.2d at 835, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 60 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
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D. Concurring Opinion by Justice Mosk
Justice Mosk, concurring with the majority in finding a
violation of the federal constitution under the Lemon test, wrote
separately to assert that the California Supreme Court should have
relied on an independent analysis under the establishment clause of
the California Constitution.15 Justice Mosk stated that California
law and California constitutional principles should have been the
Court's first concern instead of the Court's last referent.151
Recognizing that Lemon was the proper test under federal
establishment clause precedent, Justice Mosk claimed that
California was free to provide broader protection than the federal
Constitution, and could require a more exacting separation of
church and state than was necessary under the Lemon test.
152
Applying the California Constitution's religious clauses to
Sands, Justice Mosk determined that California precedent sought to
prevent government from giving any benefit to religion. 153
Therefore, the relevant inquiry, according to Justice Mosk, should
have been whether the school district had granted any benefit to
religion that had not been granted to society at large.1 54 Under
Justice Mosk's analysis, when the state gave preferential treatment
to religion by allowing a religious prayer to be placed in an exalted
position at a school sanctioned ceremony, a violation of the
California Constitution resulted. 155 Viewing the facts of Sands,
Justice Mosk stated that use of prayer to solemnize an occasion,
and the use of clergymen to give the graduation prayers, had
definitely given a preferential benefit to religion by placing prayer
in an exalted position.'56 Therefore, Justice Mosk concluded that
150. Md at 905, 809 P.2d at 836, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., concurring).
151. Id (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk also stated that it was a pure waste of time and
money to not decide the California issue since it would eventually have to be reheard if the United
States Supreme Court altered the existing establishment clause tests or protection. Id (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
152. Id at 906, 809 P.2d at 836, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., concurring).
153. Id at 911, 809 P.2d at 840, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J., concurring).
154. Id at 911-12, 809 P.2d at 840, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J., concurring).
155. Id at 912, 809 P.2d at 840, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J., concurring).
156. Id (Mosk, J., concurring).
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the California Constitution, in addition to the federal constitution,
had been violated by the prayers in issue.'57
E. Concurring Opinion by Justice Arabian
Justice Arabian, finding that federal precedent required the
application of the Lemon test, concurred with the majority's
holding that the graduation prayers in issue violated the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution when analyzed under
the Lemon factors. 15 However, Justice Arabian wrote separately
to express his discontent with the Lemon test as a guide in
establishment clause cases.159
Although Justice Arabian stated that the legislative prayer
analysis from Marsh was not helpful when considering prayer in
the public educational setting since public schools did not exist
during the time of the Framers, he found that American history did
provide the proper perspective for analyzing the ceremonial
prayers." Justice Arabian noted that ceremonial prayer was a
tradition which held an honorable place in American life and did
not threaten religious liberty. 6 ' Therefore, Justice Arabian held
that if Lemon had not been required by the Supremacy Clause and
federal precedent, the common historical acceptance of public
prayer might support the prayers in issue." Further, Justice
157. Id at 905, 809 P.2d at 835-36, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61 (Mask, J., concurring).
158. Id at 914-15, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring), Justice
Arabian did not formally analyze the prayers in Sands under the Lemon test, concurring in the
majority's application of the prayers to Lemon. See id (Arabian, J., concurring).
159. Id at 914, 809 P.2d at 842,281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Arabian
directly appealed to the United States Supreme Court to alter Lemon in future establishment clause
cases. Id at 918, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptra at 69 (Arabian, I., concurring).
160. Id at 917, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (Arabian, J., concurring).
161. Id at 916,809 P.2d at 843,281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, I., concurring). Justice Arabian
stated that George Washington, in his first inaugural address, used a prayer to ask for "His divine
blessing." Id at 917, 809 P.2d at 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Arabian
further stated that Presidential Inaugurals have not changed over the past 200 years with presidents
today often invoking religious prayers when addressing the nation. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
162. Id at 916-17,809 P.2d at 843-44,281 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice
Arabian concluded that the prayers did not threaten the religious liberty which the establishment
clause has historically sought to protect. Id (Arabian, 3., concurring).
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Arabian did not join any portions of the opinion regarding the
California Constitution, reserving judgment until a later time.163
F. Dissenting Opinion By Justice Panelli
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Panelli concluded that
invocations and benedictions at public high school graduation
ceremonies should have been upheld based on their historical
significance and the need for government accommodation of
religion.164 Asserting that the United States Supreme Court had
allowed government accommodation of historically based religious
expression in Marsh, Justice Panelli held that the challenged prayer
should have been reviewed under the Marsh historical significance
test. 1 65 Maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had
never insisted on application of Lemon, Justice Panelli refused to
take for granted that the proper analysis was Lemon without
considering alternative tests.' 66 Further, Justice Panelli found that
even if Lemon was the proper analysis, the conduct in issue would
have survived analysis under all three prongs.167
First, Justice Panelli considered the primary purpose prong of
Lemon.16 Questioning the wisdom of the majority's failure to
apply the purpose prong, Justice Panelli stated that the purpose
behind allowing the prayers should have been considered by the
Court before the prayers were categorically forbidden.16 9
163. Id at 915, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring).
164. Id at 921, 809 P.2d at 846, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
165. d (Panelli, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 921, 809 P.2d at 846, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice Panelli
stated that the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the permissibility of graduation
prayers. Id at 920, 809 P.2d at 845, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 70 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice Panelli did
not take for granted that the United States Supreme Court would have applied the Lemon test to
graduation prayers since the Supreme Court had repeatedly stated its unwillingness to be confined
to a single test. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice Panelli noted that in Marsh, one case in which the
Court had not applied the Lemon test, the Court had permitted ceremonial prayers similar to the
graduation prayers in issue. Ma. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 925, 809 P.2d at 849, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
168. Id at 926, 809 P.2d at 849, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
169. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice Panelli recognized that only one prong of Lemon
needed to be violated before the practice was deemed unconstitutional, but stated that the primary
purpose prong should have been given stronger consideration. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting).
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Applying the purpose prong, Justice Panelli determined that the
purpose of the Sands prayer was not to promote religion, but rather
to promote solemnity in a ceremonial event. 7 ' Therefore,
according to Justice Panelli, the invocations would pass judicial
scrutiny under the primary purpose prong of Lemon since the
commencement prayers were not designed to solely advance
religion.171
Applying the second prong of the Lemon test, Justice Panelli
found it difficult to believe the invocations had the effect of
benefiting religion. 172 Due to the short duration of the prayers,
Justice Panelli stated that the prayers were actually a fleeting part
of a ceremony which recognized a one-time scholastic
achievement. 173 Further, Justice Panelli argued that it was highly
unlikely that the graduating students would interpret the invocation
as government endorsement of any particular religious message due
to the maturity of the young adults. 74 Finding no benefit to
religion, Justice Panelli held that the primary effect prong of Lemon
had not been violated. 75
Applying the excessive entanglement prong, Lemon's third
factor, Justice Panelli asserted that no reason existed for school
officials to censor the content of graduation prayers. 176 Justice
Panelli reasoned that since religious and secular content could co-
exist within one prayer, no valid justification existed for curtailing
free expression of the prayers by purging them of religious
content. 177 Since censorship of the prayer content was
unnecessary, Justice Panelli held that the excessive entanglement
prong did not create an obstacle for allowing the prayers in
issue. 1
78
170. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 929, 809 P.2d at 851, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Panelli, L, dissenting).
173. I. (Panefli, J., dissenting).
174. lit (Panelli, J., dissenting).
175. 1d. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
176. Ia. at 930-31, 809 P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, L, dissenting).
177. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
178. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting).
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Justice Panelli also held that the graduation prayers had not
violated the California Constitution.'79 Citing to legislative
debates in formulation of the California Constitution, Justice Panelli
found it doubtful that the delegates who had voted to place the
words "almighty God" into the Preamble of the California
Constitution, and who opened legislative sessions with invocations,
would have intended to prohibit invocations in public high school
graduation ceremonies. "° Moreover, Justice Panelli argued that
the legislative debates on article 1, section 4 of the California
Constitution did not support Justice Kennard's and Justice Mosk's
conclusions that separation of church and state in California
extended beyond the requirements of the federal constitution since
the drafters of the California Constitution had not so indicated.1
8 1
Article I, section 4, according to Justice Panelli, simply required
that no discrimination or religious preference occur, which meant
that the state could not give preference to one religion over
another." 2 Finding that the state had not given preference to one
religion over another through the simple practice of allowing
graduation ceremonial prayers, Justice Panelli held that the
California Constitution had not been violated by the prayers in
issue.,i 3
G. Dissenting Opinion By Justice Baxter
Justice Baxter, in a dissenting opinion, concluded that there was
no justification for excluding all religious prayers from public high
school graduation ceremonies.' 84  Although Justice Baxter
conceded that some particular clauses within the invocations and
179. Id at 931, 809 P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
180. Id at 931-33, 809 P.2d at 853-54, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Debates
regarding the use of the words -almighty God" had occurred, but the majority of the California
legislature had voted to incorporate the religious words into the Preamble as a means of solemnizing
the California Constitution. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting).
181. Id at 933, 809 P.2d at 854,281 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Panelli, J., dissenting). See supra notes
99-100 and accompanying text (discussing article I, section 4 of the California Constitution).
182. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 935, 809 P.2d at 856, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Panelli, ., dissenting).
183. Id (Panelli, J., dissenting).
184. Id at 939, 809 P.2d at 859, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Baxter, L, dissenting).
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benedictions at issue created establishment clause infractions, he
found that significant portions of the prayers did not violate the
establishment clause.181 Justice Baxter agreed with the majority
that the Lemon test applied to the Sands case,"" but stated that
the majority's decision to ban all religious prayers from graduation
ceremonies was an overly broad application of Lemon.'87 The
Court, according to Justice Baxter, could have excluded the specific
prayers which had violated the establishment clause without a
categorical ban of all graduation ceremony prayers. 8
Further, Justice Baxter found no violation of the California
Constitution.'89 Although he determined that several provisions
of the California Constitution referred to separation between church
and state, Justice Baxter found no requirement for an absolute ban
of religious activity at school-sanctioned events.1" Accordingly,
Justice Baxter would have upheld the practice of ceremonial
prayers at public high school commencement exercises under the
federal constitution and the California Constitution.'19
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The decision in Sands settled a dispute among the California
appellate courts by concluding that prayer at public high school
graduation ceremonies violates the establishment clause of the
135. 1& at 940-43, 809 P.2d at 858-62,281 Cal. Rptr. at 84-87 (Baxter, J., dissenting). Justice
Baxter stated that prayers, which asked the audience to stand and join in prayer, or repeatedly
indicated that the audience as a whole was seeking God's blessing, might create establishment clause
violations. Id. (Baxter, I., dissenting). However prayers which simply stated that the speaker sought
God's blessing, or prayers which asked the audience to join in prayer if they so chose, did not create
the same establishment clause violations since such prayers allowed for religious freedom which was
the intent of the first amendment. IM (Baxter, J., dissenting).'
186. Id at 940, 809 P.2d at 859, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
187. Id at 944, 809 P.2d at 862, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (Baxter, I., dissenting). Justice Baxter
concluded that the majority had been overly broad in its Lemon test analysis since it could have
excluded the prayers which had created obvious violations, instead of excluding all prayers from
graduation ceremonies. d (Baxter, J., dissenting).
188. Id (Baxter, J., dissenting).
189. Id at 947, 809 P.2d at 864, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
190. Id at 945-47, 809 P.2d at 863-64, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 88-89 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
191. id. (Baxter, j., dissenting).
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United States Constitution.' 92 In order to reach the conclusion in
Sands, the California Supreme Court applied the three-part
establishment clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman. 9 3 The Court
construed the facts of Sands to conclude that the prayers in issue
had violated the primary effect and the excessive entanglement
prongs of the Lemon test. i94 In so doing, the majority in Sands
asserted that its decision was in accordance with current federal
establishment clause precedent. 95
A. The Lemon Test Controversy
Due to the broad acceptance of the Lemon factors in the
majority of cases asserting establishment clause violations the
majority in Sands concluded that the appropriate analysis under the
establishment clause of the United States Constitution was the tri-
parte Lemon test. 196 However, as pointed out in Justice Panelli's
dissent, the United States Supreme Court has not adopted Lemon
as the sole establishment clause analysis. 97 Since the United
States Supreme Court has not spoken on the constitutionality of
graduation prayers under the federal Constitution, and in light of
discord among the United States Supreme Court Justices as to the
192. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the first
and fourth district appellate courts).
193. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (discussing
application of the three Lemon factors to Sands).
194. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the primary
effect and excessive entanglement prongs to Sands).
195. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
196. Id. at 871, 809 P.2d at 812, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
197. Id. at 920, 809 P.2d at 845, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 70 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Despite Justice
Panelli's assertion that the Lemon test has not been adopted as the sole establishment clause analysis,
the United States Supreme Court's overwhelming application of Lemon in establishment clause cases
would suggest that Lemon is presumptively applied unless countervailing justifications command
consideration of alternative tests. See supra notes 22-72 and accompanying text (discussing
alternatives to the Lemon test).
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credibility of the Lemon test,"' it remains undetermined whether
Lemon will be the test of choice on this issue.199
The Lemon test controversy stems from criticism that strict
application of the Lemon test categorically excludes many religious
activities without directing proper consideration toward the
historical significance of the religious conduct in issue.2 "0 Further
criticism of the Lemon test has resulted from the United States
Supreme Court's admitted inconsistencies in addressing
establishment clause dilemmas under Lemon.2°t The United States
Supreme Court Justices, and scholarly critics of Lemon, however,
are divided as to whether the test should be reformulated,
disregarded in limited cases, or abolished altogether.2
Strict application of Lemon has been questioned by several
United States Supreme Court Justices in recent cases.203 Justice
O'Connor, suggesting that Lemon be refined or reworked, has
favored a reformulation of Lemon which focuses on government
endorsement of religious messages rather than on the purpose and
198. See infra notes 203-211 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme
Court Justices' opinions regarding the Lemon test).
199. But see Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1091 (1st Cir. 1990) cerr. granted sub nom. Leo
v. Weisman, 111 U.S. 1305 (1991) (No. 90-1014) (considering whether prayers given during a public
junior high school graduation ceremony violated the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution). See infra notes 263-270 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the United
States Supreme Court's pending decision in Weisman could have upon future cases brought under
the establishment clause of the California Constitution).
200. See Religion and the State, supra note 2, at 1644 (criticizing the tendency of the Lemon
test to categorically define religious activity); Marshall, supra note 75, at 495-99 (1986) (observing
that the Court's applications of the Lemon test in the area of establishment clause analysis form an
incoherent framework which easily turns on seemingly inconsequential factual determinations);
Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clause -A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV.
1195, 1217 (1980) (stating that application of the Lemon test involves personal judgment regarding
how the activity will effect the school environment based on the judge's personal tolerance for
religious activity).
201. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,662 (1980) (stating that the Court
recognizes its inconsistent opinions in establishment clause precedent); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (stating that the Court's inconsistencies in establishment clause doctrine stem
from sacrificing clarity and predictability for flexibility).
202. See infra notes 203-216 and accompanying text (discussing the various United States
Supreme Court Justice's suggestions regarding Lemon, as well as legal scholars' opinions on the
abolition or reformulation of the Lemon test).
203. See infra notes 204-211 and accompanying text (discussing the varying opinions of several
United States Supreme Court Justices).
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effect of government activity.2" The Court formally adopted
Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis in County ofAllegheny v.
ACLU.2"5 Justice Kennedy, often joined by Justice Scalia, has
projected his own test, appearing to favor complete abandonment
of the three part Lemon test for a test which would favor
accommodation of religious practices and invalidate government
activity only if such activity directly supported religious conduct or
coerced persons to engage in religious activity.2 Justice White
and Chief Justice Rehnquist have on occasion joined with Justice
Kennedy and Justice Scalia, expressing discontent over the strict
application of the Lemon factors.2 7 Further, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,"8 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, stated
that the Lemon test was a constitutional theory which had no basis
in the history of the first amendment it sought to interpret, was
difficult to apply, and resulted in unprincipled results.2" Justice
White, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,2 ' stated that Lemon
imposed unnecessary and often superfluous tests for establishing
first amendment violations.211
Moreover, the Lemon test has incurred growing criticism among
legal scholars due to the high degree of judicial subjectivity and
categorical exclusion of religious conduct which has occurred in
204. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's endorsement
analysis). See generally Smith, supra note 17, at 299 (discussing the application of the endorsement
test to religious activity).
205. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). See supra note 51 (discussing the Court's decision in Allegheny).
206. See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247
(1990) (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(discussing Justice Kennedy's alternative test based on coercion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, I., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Scalia, JJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Justice Kennedy's discontent with the
Lemon test and suggesting a return to a test considering coercion).
207. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Scalia,
JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Justice Kennedy's desire
to apply a new establishment clause analysis).
208. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
209. Id at 112.
210. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
211. Id at 768 (White, J., concurring).
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establishment clause cases applying the Lemon test.2" As
indicated by the majority's application of Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test in Sands, rather than balancing the weight of
evidence in the record, or remanding the case for further factual
consideration, application of Lemon led the California Supreme
Court to conclude that all graduation ceremonial prayers in public
high schools involved a high degree of government endorsement
and religious advancement. 3 By concluding that the prayers
resulted in government endorsement, the California Supreme Court
broadly excluded, as a matter of law, all graduation prayers from
the public school system, instead of excluding only particular
prayers which violate the establishment clause.214 Such subjective
fact finding provided no guidance for lower courts attempting to
analyze religious conduct under the establishment clause, other than
indicating that a categorical exclusion of graduation prayers was
required. 215 However, despite the lack of guidance to lower courts
and the controversy surrounding Lemon, the Sands Court upheld
the application of the tri-parte test in establishment clause
cases.
2 16
212. See Ripple, supra note 200, at 1216-18 (discussing judicial subjectivity and the
entanglement prong). See also Religion and the State, supra note 2, at 1644-1647 (criticizing the
tendency of the Lemon test to categorically define religious activity based on subjective
interpretations). See generally Marshall, supra note 75, at 496 (criticizing the United States Supreme
Court's establishment clause analyses).
213. See supra notes 117-137 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
Sands).
214. See supra notes 164-191 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Panelli's and Justice
Baxter's concerns that the majority had been overly broad in the application of the Lemon test). See
also Ripple, supra note 200, at 1216-18 (discussing judicial subjectivity of the Lemon test).
215. Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 941,809 P.2d 809, 860,281 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 85 (1991) (Baxter, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter stated that the school district had asked
the court for guidance in applying the Lemon test to its practice of including religious invocations
in the ceremonies, and the court had failed to provide any guidance. l (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justice Baxter stated that instead of guidance, the court had provided only an absolute bar to
inclusion of the prayers. ld. (Baxter, J., dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 66, at 413 (stating
that lower courts lack certainty in applying the Lemon analysis which leads some courts to avoid
Lemon altogether).
216. See supra notes 101-191 and accompanying text (discussing the Sands decision).
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B. "School Prayer" Cases Extended Beyond the Classroom
By classifying high school graduation prayer as school prayer,
the Sands decision has expanded the school prayer cases to exclude
religious conduct beyond the confinement of the classroom
setting.217 In determining the constitutionality of the graduation
prayers, the Sands Court intermingled instructional classroom
prayers found to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, with the brief ceremonial prayers of the traditional
graduation ceremony.21 Although the graduation ceremonies are
closely related to the public school system, application of the
school prayer cases excludes from consideration historic traditions
of graduation invocations.21 9
There are many differences between classroom prayer and
graduation prayer.' ° Graduation ceremonies are analogous to
traditional public ceremonies that have existed throughout
America's history as a means of solemnizing an event or rewarding
individuals for their accomplishments." I Further, graduation is
not a time of educational instruction, but rather an administrative
ceremony to reward students for their educational
achievements.' Relying on arguments from public classroom
prayer cases, the Sands majority suggests that graduation prayers
217. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text (discussing the school prayer cases). See
also Note, supra note 56, at 1256 (stating that application of the school prayer cases to the graduation
context will expand the regulation of religious activity beyond the classroom setting).
218. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text (discussing the school prayer cases).
219. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1408 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing
the school board's contention that the school prayer cases were developed for the classroom
environment and do not extend to graduation exercises which are only annual occasions of a festive,-
celebratory nature). See also Note, supra note 56, at 1257 (stating that application of the school
prayer cases to graduation prayer cases fails to take account of the secular purposes behind
invocations, fails to consider the formality of the ceremony, and fails to maintain the traditional
nature of graduation ceremony).
220. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between
classroom prayer and graduation prayer).
221. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409 (discussing the history behind graduation prayers).
222. At See also Arguments Before the Court, 60 U.S.LW. 3351, 3352 (1991) (stating that
graduation ceremonies are not part of the instructional process).
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223should not to be treated differently than classroom prayer.
However, graduation ceremonies are not infused with the same
concerns that supported finding classroom prayer
unconstitutional.22
First, the graduating seniors are of the age of social maturity,
so that vulnerability of religious indoctrination or influence does
not exist as it does with younger children.2" Additionally,
parents, family, and friends are generally present at graduation
ceremonies, thereby removing the coercive influence that a teacher
might have in a classroom without parental supervision. 6 The
students often control the graduation ceremony, choose the
speakers, and play a large part in the celebration of their
accomplishments, while the teachers and administrators take a more
passive role in these ceremonies.' 2 By the time the graduation
ceremony occurs, the educational classroom instruction has been
completed, removing any possibility of coercion by school officials,
or coercion due to the school environment, towards non-
participants.' 2 Further, while the school prayer cases involved
daily repetition of prayer, the graduation prayers occur once a year
for 30-90 seconds, and finally, while classroom attendance is
mandatory, attendance at graduation ceremonies is not.'
However, countervailing arguments suggested that the duration
or repetition of the prayer is irrelevant since it is not the quantity
of religious endorsement that the establishment clause seeks to
223. Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863,863,809 P.2d 809, 809,281 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 34 (1991).
224. See Arguments Before the Court, supra note 222, at 3352 (listing various differentiating
factors between school prayer and classroom prayer)
225. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 929, 809 P.2d at 851, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
226. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409 (discussing the lack of coercion due to parental presence).
However, this argument fails to consider that coercion is no longer a factor in consideration of
establishment clause violations. See Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 877, 809 P.2d at 817, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 42
(stating that coercion has not been an element in establishment clause cases for nearly three decades).
227. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 893-94, 809 P.2d at 827, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring); Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
228. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 893, 809 P.2d at 827,281 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
229. Id (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
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prohibit, but the fact of its existence at all.23 0 First, although
graduation ceremonies are not mandatory, the vast majority of
graduating students do attend the ceremonies.231 Opponents of
high school graduation prayer assert that it would be improper to
expect graduating seniors to choose between listening to a prayer
during their graduation ceremony verses not attending a graduation
ceremony which is designed to honor their educational
accomplishments.232  Finally, although the ceremonies are
generally non-educational, graduation ceremonies are an integral
part of the educational process, which are often organized and
controlled by public school district officials.23 Considering the
countervailing arguments, it is difficult to conclude, that the Sands
Court erred by applying the school prayer cases in the graduation
prayer context.
C. Historical Significance of Ceremonial Prayer Finds No Place
in the Public Schools.
Relying on a strict application of Lemon, the majority in Sands
did not extend the Marsh analysis to the public school setting.
2 34
Each justice of the California Supreme Court admitted that prayer
230. Id at 875,809 P.2d at 815,281 Cal. Rptr. at 40. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
583-83 (1987) (stating that vigilant compliance with the establishment clause is necessary in the
public elementary and secondary school system). See generally Note, supra note 20, at 478 (stating
that the Court has been careful to scrutinize government involvement with religious activity in the
context of public schools).
231. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 878, 809 P.2d at 817, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
232. Id It is suggested that such a choice would be no choice at all. Id.
233. Id at 873-74, 809 P.2d at 814, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39. Justice Kennard asserted that the
school district officials could not avoid excessive entanglement with religion when they were
monitoring the content of the prayers and participating in the selection of the speakers. Id. at 879,
809 P.2d at 817-18, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43. In addressing Justice Kennard, Justice Panelli asserted
that there was no need for school officials to involve themselves in the monitoring of prayer content
since freedom of expression should allow the speakers to speak as they choose. Id at 930-31, 809
P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice Panelli did
not explain how the Court in Sands could have engaged in an examination of the prayers in issue,
to determine which prayers did or did not violate the establishment clause, without themselves
violating the excessive entanglement prong by monitoring religious content. See id (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
234. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's consideration
of Marsh).
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was a historically permissible religious practice in the United
States. 35 However, the Sands Court concluded that the historical
justifications did not extend to allowing prayer in public
schools.
236
Graduation ceremonies throughout the California school system
have a long tradition of including invocations and benedictions.
237
Historically, the Framers of the Constitution opened their legislative
sessions with prayers,238 while Presidents speaking to the nation
have addressed Americans with prayers.239 Even the federal
courts open courtroom proceedings with a brief prayer.24° Further,
in Marsh v. Chambers,24' the Supreme Court recognized that
legislative invocations did not violate the establishment clause since
the Framers of the Constitution allowed the First Congress to open
with a legislative prayer.242 Despite the existence of at least some
judicial support for ceremonial prayer, the California Supreme
Court did not expand the Marsh decision to public high school
graduation prayers. 243  By limiting the Sands decision to an
analysis under the Lemon test, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the Marsh analysis was not meant to extend beyond
its immediate facts.
244
235. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d at 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
236. Id.
237. Answering Brief for Respondents at 1, Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal.
3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991) (stating that graduation prayer is a long standing
tradition in the California school districts).
238. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer during
the First Congress based on its historical significance).
239. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Presidents Adams and Madison also issued Thanksgiving
Proclamations. See SToKEs, CHURCH AND STATE IN Tam UNrmr STATES 180-193 (1950). Further,
Presidents have repeatedly issued proclamations recognizing religious holidays. Id.
240. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (recognizing the practice of federal courts to open the
proceedings by stating -God save the United States and this Honorable Court.")
241. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
242. Id. at 795 (upholding legislative prayer based on its historical significance during First
Congress).
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D. Maturity of High School Graduates is NOt Considered
In referring to the inherent coerciveness of the school classroom
which was relied upon in Engle v. Vitale,245 the majority in Sands
did not consider the maturity of the graduating high school
seniors.24' By the time of graduation, the average graduating
senior is eighteen years of age.247 At the age of eighteen, the
State of California and the federal government recognize that these
young adults are able to hold public office,248 to vote in public
elections,249  to serve America in the armed forces," to
251 252marry,,2" and in most states, to enter into binding contracts.
At the even younger age of sixteen, the state of California allows
these young adults to operate motor vehicles, 53 to be punished
for their actions in the commission of crimes,-54 and in some
instances to obtain confidential medical treatment without parental
245. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
246. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Respondents to Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress at 3,
Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 251 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991)
[hereinafter Reply Brieffor Respondents] (recognizing the maturity level of high school graduates).
See Albright v. Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 691 (recognizing that high
school students are not "babes in arms" and are mature enough to know prayer is not government
endorsement of religion).
247. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246, at 4 (stating that the average
graduating high school senior is eighteen or nearly eighteen years of age).
248. See, e.g., CAL GOV'T CODE § 1020 (West 1980); See Reply Brief for Respondents, supra
note 246, at 4 (stating that graduates are old enough to hold some public offices).
249. See, e.g., CAL CONST. art. II, § 2; Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246, at 4
(stating that eighteen-year olds may vote in federal and state elections).
250. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.S. § 505 (1985); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246, at 4
(stating that at the age of eighteen, young males must register for Selective Service in the armed
forces and both males and females are of age to enroll themselves in the armed forces).
251. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 25 (West 1982); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246,
at 4 (stating that at the age of eighteen, young adults are allowed to marry without parental consent).
252. See, e.g., CAL Civ. CODE § 25 (West 1982); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246,
at 4 (stating that at the age of eighteen, most states allow young adults to bind themselves into lawful
contracts).
253. See, e.g., CAL- VEH. CODE § 17701 (West 1982); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note
246, at 4 (stating that at the age of sixteen, young adults may seek their driver's license).
254. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1988); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note
246, at 4-5 (stating that sixteen-year olds are able to be tried and punished for their wrongs).
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consent. 5 To assert that high school graduates are capable of
making the above decisions, but incapable of hearing a thirty to
ninety second prayer due to their easily influenced minds appears
highly contradictory. 6 Although the concern regarding student
vulnerability may be a valid consideration when younger primary
school children are involved, it appears misplaced when applied to
the graduating high school student. 7
E. California Implications
Due to the current trend by the United States Supreme Court to
limit government action where individual rights are threatened, a
re-evaluation of California's state constitution has become
extremely important.28 The California provisions which govern
aid to religion are much more explicit than the federal constitution
provisions, thereby providing the California courts with further
guidance in evaluating the degree of separation necessary between
church and state. 9 California has largely ignored the religious
clauses of its own Constitution, and instead has relied heavily on
255. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 46010.1 (West 1982 to Supp. 1992); CAL. CIv. CODE §§
25.9, 34.50 (West 1982 to Supp. 1992); Reply Brief for Respondents, supra note 246, at 5 (stating
that young adults of at least sixteen years of age may seek confidential medical treatment without
a parent's consent in limited circumstances).
256. See Note, supra note 56, at 1264 (stating that the invocation and benediction were not
directed at impressionable children, but were directed at an audience consisting of mostly adults who
were less susceptible to the proselytizing that was a primary concern in public school classrooms).
257. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (noting maturity of college-age
students renders them less susceptible to religious influence or indoctrination). However, in support
of the majority's decision to disregard the maturity of graduating seniors, it should be noted that a
test which focuses upon the maturity of the students might lead to further confusion in establishment
clause doctrine by involving the courts in subjective determinations of a student's maturity level. By
drawing a bright line between the college students and the primary or secondary school students, the
Sands Court has upheld a bright line classification based on educational levels, instead of an
independent maturity analysis of each grade level or each student.
258. Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 81, 81 (1981) (discussing importance of California Constitution in light of federal limits
on first amendment protection).
259. Id. at 88. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (reciting the California religion
clauses).
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broad federal protection.2"o However, the current trend of limiting
federal first amendment protection suggests that California's
Constitution can no longer be overlooked.2 '
In Sands, the California Supreme Court was unable to reach a
majority decision as to whether the California Constitution had
been violated, leaving this issue open for future consideration.262
Determination of this issue may become exceedingly important,
hinging on the outcome of the United States Supreme Court's
pending decision in Lee v. Weisman.263 In Lee, the United States
Supreme Court will determine whether prayers at a public junior
high school in Rhode Island violated the establishment clause of
the United States Constitution.26' During oral argument to the
United States Supreme Court, counsel for the school board of
Rhode Island urged the Court to replace the three part Lemon test
with a test, similar to Marsh, which would provide accommodation
to historically acceptable religious practices.265 The respondents,
opposing the graduation prayers, argued for retention of the
traditional Lemon test.2  Since the facts and arguments presented
in Lee are very similar to those in Sands,267 the decision in Lee
260. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of Religious
Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINoS LJ. 499, 501 (1986)
(discussion of California cases refusing to expand the California Constitution beyond the federal
Constitution).
261. See Crosby, supra note 258, at 81 (stating that California's Constitution can no longer be
ignored). See also Note, supra note 260, at 499-502 (stating that the religion clauses of the California
Constitution can no longer be ignored).
262. See supra notes 101-191 and accompanying text (discussing the Sands opinion).
263. Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014 (1992). See Reidinger, Let Us Pray: Graduation without
Benediction, 77 A.B.A. J. 90, 90 (Aug. 1991) (stating that if the United States Supreme Court holds
that graduation prayers do not offend the federal Constitution, the California ruling could be
.. vulnerable to hostile review on the ground that it does not rest on an "adequate and independent'
state rationale.").
264. Weisman, 908 F.2d at 1091 (considering whether prayers given during a public junior high
school graduation ceremony violated the establishment clause of the United States Constitution). See
also, Reske, Does Prayer Belong at Graduation?, 78 ABA J. 47,47 (Feb. 1992) (discussing the Lee
v. Weisman case).
265. See Arguments Before the Court, supra note 222, at 3351 (discussing the oral arguments
in Lee v. Weisman).
266. Id.
267. Reidinger, supra note 263, at 90 (stating that Sands and Lee both considered whether
prayers at public school graduation ceremonies violated the establishment clause of the United States
Constitution).
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will have great impact upon the California Supreme Court's
decision.268
If the United States Supreme Court determines that the
graduation prayers violate the establishment clause, then the
California Supreme Court will be unlikely to reconsider the
California Constitution on this issue.' However, if Lee finds no
violation of the establishment clause, or drastically alters the
current establishment clause protection in favor of limiting first
amendment restrictions, the California Court will doubtlessly once
again face the issue of graduation prayer under the California
Constitution's religion clauses.270 Since the State of California is
free to provide greater separation of church and state than the
federal first amendment protection, the California religion clauses
will become the focus of protection for those opposed to public
school graduation prayers.27"
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District,272 upheld application of the three-prong Lemon
268. Id
269. There will be no need for the California Supreme Court to rehear whether graduation
prayers violated the establishment clause of the California Constitution as long as the federal
establishment clause excludes such activity.
270. See Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 906-07, 809 P.2d at 836,281 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (1991) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court will likely rehear the constitutionality of graduation prayers under
the California Constitution if the United States Supreme Court alters the current establishment clause
tests).
271. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing the California Constitution).
If the California Supreme Court were to reconsider the graduation prayers under the California
Constitution, it is difficult to speculate upon how the various justices would hold. See Ripple, supra
note 200, at 1224-25 (stating that it has always been particularly difficult to predict the future trend
of the religion clause doctrine). Although Justice Kennard and Justice Mosk held in Sands that the
California Constitution had been violated, Justice Panelli and Justice Baxter did not agree. See supra
notes 101-191 and accompanying text (discussing the various Justices' opinions in Sands). Further,
given Chief Justice Lucas' and Justice Arabian's discontent with the Lemon test, it is unclear which
direction these Justices will sway. See supra notes 137-149 and 158-163 and accompanying text
(discussing Chief Justice Lucas' and Justice Arabian's opinion in Sands). Finally Justice George,
replacing Justice Broussard as the newest Justice to the California Supreme Court, did not sit on the
Court during consideration of Sands. Therefore, it is unclear how Justice George would hold on the
California issues.
272. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
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test in establishment clause cases, and accordingly held that public
high school graduation invocations and benedictions violated the
establishment clause of the United States Constitution. Hence,
individuals seeking to use religious expression to solemnize
occasions or join citizens together, will be forced to refrain from
such expression at public school functions. The final result is a
further separation of church and state under the first amendment's
establishment clause in California's public schools.
Michaelle S. DiGrazia

